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ABSTRACT 
This paper aims to explore the role of judicial review as 
a control on the use of discretionary powers by regulators in 
the securities markets, and has two main conclusions. 
The first is that the powers of both the Securities Commission 
and the New Zealand Stock Exchange can be characterized as 
public law powers, and will thus be subject to administrative 
law controls in appropriate cases. 
The second is that the case law in New Zealand and overseas 
indicates that courts will be reluctant to exercise their 
jurisdiction in a manner which may interfere with the 
workings of these markets, except in extreme cases. 
As a result of this passive participation by the courts it is 
expected that judicial review will not have a negative effect on 
the smooth running of the markets. Rather, a guiding role by 
the courts may serve to increase investor confidence by 
guarding the rights of market participants and by acting as a 
moderator on the powers of the regulators. 
WORD LENGTH 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes, 
bibliography and abstract) comprises approximately 14, 940 
words. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
Securities law is concerned with regulating offers of 
securities to the public and trading in publicly offered 
securities. This is an inherently commercial field, and it is 
not surprising that there is a lot of debate surrounding the 
subject of securities regulation. This debate revolves around 
economic arguments addressing the issues of investor 
protection and capital attraction. These arguments have in 
various ways affected the structure and practice of securities 
regulation in NZ, resulting in regulation by both government 
bodies and industry representatives. In both cases the 
regulators possess considerable discretionary powers to aid 
them in overseeing the conduct of the markets. 
It is a function of judicial review to ensure that public law 
powers are exercised lawfully, fairly and reasonably. In 
recent years the courts have increasingly been asked to apply 
this jurisdiction in commercial situations where public law 
issues are at stake. The purpose of this paper is to examine 
the present possibilities for application of judicial review to 
the securities markets. This will include an examination of 
both the scope of judicial review in this area, and the way in 
which this flexible jurisdiction is and may be applied to 
discretionary decisions of securities regulators. The paper 
will also consider the effect that the exercise of administrative 
law controls is having and may have on the securities 
markets. 
In examining judicial review in this field the paper will focus 
firstly on the general oversight functions of the Securities 
Commission under the Securities Act 1978. The paper will 
then examine the use of judicial review in relation to the 
regulation of investment prospectuses under the Securities 
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Act, and to the regulation of secondary dealing in securities 
by the New Zealand Stock Exchange. 
II JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Before examining the application of judicial review 
with respect to securities regulation it is useful to provide a 
brief summary of judicial review itself. This part of the paper 
will outline the purposes and aims of judicial review, and will 
describe the scope of the jurisdiction, the principal grounds on 
which a decision may be reviewed, and the remedies available 
to a court when granting review. 
Briefly stated, the purpose of judicial review is to provide a 
means by which the judiciary can act as a check on the 
exercise of discretionary public power.1 In New Zealand 
applications for judicial review may be brought under the 
Judicature Amendment Act 1972 (JAA) in situations where 
review is sought of an exercise of statutory power as defined 
in that Act.2 Review may still be obtained through the 
prerogative writs under the High Court Rules.3 Additionally 
the courts can exercise a supervisory role in terms of the Bill 
of Rights Act 1990, which will apply to any exercise of a 
function, power or duty conferred by or pursuant to law. The 
common law jurisdiction has been little used since the advent 
of the JAA, a fact that has been criticized, particularly in 
relation to commercial activities.4 This jurisdiction may well 
provide a means for supervising public law powers exercised 
other than pursuant to a statutory power. 
2 
3 
4 
M Chen & G Palmer Public Law in New Zealand (Oxford University 
Press , Auckland, 1993), 927. 
Judicature Amendment Act 1972 ss 2, 4. 
High Court Rules Part VII. 
M Taggart "State Owned Enterprises and Social Responsibility: A 
contradiction in terms?" [1993] NZ Recent Law Review 343, 356-
359 . 
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The classic statement of the grounds upon which judicial 
review may be sought is that of Lord Diplock in the GCHQ 
case. These grounds are illegality, irrationality and 
procedural impropriety.5 In reality these heads often overlap, 
and a decision may be reviewable under more than one 
ground. Additionally there are a number of other potential 
grounds for review that are less well established than these 
three. 
A challenge for illegality may include claims that the decision 
was made for an improper purpose,6 that the decision-maker 
either took into account irrelevant factors or failed to take 
into account relevant matters, 7 that the decision was made 
under the influence of a factual error,8 or that the decision-
maker fettered their discretion unlawfully.9 
Irrationality in judicial review may also be referred to as 
unreasonableness. In this context a decision might be called 
irrational if the decision is so unreasonable that no 
reasonable authority could ever have come to it.10 Unlike 
most other grounds of judicial review, this requires an 
examination of the merits of the decision. The reluctance of 
the courts to be seen to do this on review may account for the 
very high standard that must be met. 
The ground of procedural impropriety is concerned entirely 
s Council for Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service 
(1985] AC 374, 410. 
6 Rowling v Takara Properties Ltd (1975] 2 NZLR 62. 
7 CREEDNZ Inc v Governor-General (1981] 1 NZLR 172 (CA). 
a NZ Cereal Foods Ltd v Minister of Customs Unreported , High Court 
Wellington 11 May 1987, CP 193/87 Greig J . 
9 G Taylor Judicial Review: a New Zealand Perspective (Butterworths, 
Wellington, 1991) 344-346. 
1 o Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation 
(1947] 2 KB 223 (CA), 228-229. 
8 
with the decision-making process. There are two aspects to 
this ground. The first, often referred to as natural justice is 
that a decision-maker must conform to any procedural rules 
required by law, such as the provision of a hearing or notice of 
intended action.11 A similar requirement is found ins 27(1) of 
the Bill of Rights Act 1990, concerning decisions in respect of 
a person's "rights, obligations, or interests protected or 
recognised by law." The second part of procedural 
impropriety is the rule that a decision-maker must not be 
biased in their decision. The standards to be met will vary 
according to the nature of the tribunal in question, with the 
aim being to not only prevent actual bias in decision-making, 
but to maintain public confidence in the impartiality of 
decision-makers. 
It is suggested above that other grounds for review may exist 
beyond the three considered so far. These grounds include 
proportionality and mistake of fact. Just as the established 
grounds may sometimes overlap, so these "new" grounds are 
sometimes considered to be no more than facets of the 
established grounds of review. Thus the ground of 
proportionality has been treated as merely a consideration for 
the court in deciding whether a decision is unreasonable.12 
Equally review for mistake of fact may be considered an 
aspect of illegality, though this ground has received 
acceptance as a ground on its own.13 
An important aspect of judicial review is the discretionary 
nature of the remedies. This discretion has permitted the 
11 South Australia v O'Shea (1987) 163 CLR 378, per Mason CJ at 386. 
1 2 Isaac v Minister of Consumer Affairs [1990] 2 NZLR 606; R v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Brind and 
Others [1991] 2 WLR 588, per Lord Roskill at 594. 
1 3 Devonport Borough Council v Local Government Commission [1989] 2 
NZLR 203 (CA). 
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judicial review jurisdiction to be exercised with great 
flexibility, and means that the jurisdiction can be shaped to 
fit differing circumstances. Where review is granted, 
remedies available to the court include quashing the decision 
under review, issuing an injunction or declaration, or 
referring a decision back to the decision-maker with 
directions for its reconsideration.14 It is not generally 
possible to gain damages in proceedings for judicial review. 
However, in Baigent v Attorney -Generall5 the majority of the 
Court of Appeal held that monetary compensation can be 
available where a person brings an action based on a breach 
of the Bill of Rights Act 1990. It has since been held that 
damages may be recoverable for loss of future earnings 
stemming from such a breach.16 This fact may have some 
impact for those affected by unlawful actions of regulators in 
the securities area and may in some circumstances provide an 
alternative to proceedings in tort, as was the case in Baigent. 
III THE SECURITIES COMMISSION 
The main legislation in this area is the Securities Act 1978 
(the 'Act'). The Act provides a definition of 'security' and sets 
out a regulatory framework for the initial offering of 
securities to the public, and for the oversight of the markets 
generally. 
The body created to oversee the implementation of the Act is 
the Securities Commission (the "Commission"). This body 
acts to protect investors by monitoring compliance with the 
Act and bringing prosecutions for breaches of some areas of 
1 4 Judicature Amendment Act 1972 s 4. 
1 s [1994) 3 NZLR 667 (CA). 
1 6 Jackson v Attorney-General Unreported High Court, Auckland 
Registry, 20 November 1995, CPA 2/95. 
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securities law.17 It has additional functions which bring it 
into direct contact with the securities market and issuers of 
securities as a monitor and enforcer of the Act. 
The Commission was established under s 9 of the Act. The 
Commission's functions include both general functions 
relating to securities regulation and specific functions to do 
with the disclosure regime in Part II of the Act. 
A General Functions and Powers 
The general functions of the Securities Commission are 
to "keep under review the law relating to bodies corporate, 
securities, and incorporated issuers of securities"18 and "to 
keep under review practices relating to securities",19 and to 
recommend changes to the Minister. Further it must co-
operate with overseas securities commissions, and promote 
understanding of the law and practices relating to 
securities .20 These functions indicate at first sight that the 
principal role of the Commission is to be a monitoring body in 
the securities field. 
It was obviously the intention of Parliament that in relation 
to its general oversight functions the Commission should not 
be hindered in its attempts to monitor the markets. Section 
17 of the Act confers upon the Securities Commission such 
powers as are reasonably necessary or expedient to enable it 
to carry out its functions, and s 15 allows the Commission 
generally to regulate its own procedure. These general grants 
of power should in themselves be considered pro forma, and 
1 7 See for instance Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd v 
Securities Commission [1995] 3 NZLR 7. 
1 a Securities Act 1978 s 10 (b ). 
1 9 Securities Act 1978 s 10 ( c). 
20 Securities Act 1978 s 10 (ea) , (d) . 
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do not endow the Commission with any unusual influence. 
The scope of the Commission's power has been determined 
more by the broad expression of its functions and the 
interpretation of these functions by the courts. Additionally 
the Act confers a number of specific powers upon the 
Commission to aid it in keeping under review the law and 
practices relating to securities. 
The Commission may summon persons to appear before it to 
give evidence on oath and to produce any documents required 
by the Commission in relation to any matter before it.21 The 
only procedural requirement placed on the Commission is 
that any such summons must be delivered at least 24 hours 
before the attendance is required. This section does not 
provide a right to counsel where a person is summoned, nor is 
there any further natural justice requirement in relation to 
this section. Failure to answer a summons from the 
Commission is an offence.22 
Another power of considerable interest to issuers and of 
possibly wide effect is provided in s 28A. This provides that 
the Commission may publish any report or comment made by 
it in the course of the exercise or intended exercise of its 
functions. This power provides the Commission with the 
ability to have considerable impact on the securities market, 
as adverse comment on a particular company or area of 
practice could have considerable negative effect on the 
response of investors. These general functions of the 
Commission are not limited to oversight of the primary 
market, but encompass the stock exchange and other 
secondary trading arenas. 
21 Securities Act 1978 s 18. 
22 Securities Act 1978 s 32 (a) . 
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B Judicial Review of the General Powers 
It seems reasonably clear that in carrying out its 
general functions the Commission is exercising statutory 
powers in terms of the JAA. In principle at least then, 
decisions or exercises of power by the Commission under the 
Securities Act will be amenable to review under the JAA. The 
next task is to examine the extent to which the courts are 
willing to exercise this jurisdiction in relation to actions of the 
Commission, and the grounds upon which actions may be 
reviewed. 
1. Scope of Judicial Review 
The courts have widely interpreted the extent of the 
Securities Commission's role under its general functions. In 
City Realties v Securities Commission23 the Court of Appeal 
indicated that a generous interpretation of the Commission's 
powers under the general functions was in keeping with the 
policy of the Act: 
.. .it would not be surprising if Parliament had seen fit to set up 
the Commission with what Quilliam J calls a watchdog role , as 
well as a law reform one, extending to the review of specific 
takeovers, whether accomplished or proposed.24 
The policy intentions of the Securities Act were used as the 
yardstick for establishing the limits of the Commission's 
powers . Cooke J noted that traditional company law 
doctrines had not been effective in protecting shareholders, 
particularly minority shareholders, and ascribed to 
Parliament the intention of remedying this deficiency.25 The 
Commission's review function under s 10 was described as 
"very wide indeed."26 
23 [1982] 1 NZLR 74. 
24 Above n 23, 78. 
25 Above n 23, 78. 
26 Above n 23, 79. 
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It is clear from the City Realties judgment that the Securities 
Commission will be given considerable discretion in deciding 
which areas of securities law and practice to investigate, and 
where and when inquiries should be conducted. It was 
established that the s 10 functions empowered the 
Commission to carry out inquiries into specific transactions . 
The court held that these decisions were essentially matters 
within the Commission's own discretion.27 However it was 
not disputed that the exercise of power by the Commission in 
carrying out its functions may be judicially reviewed if these 
powers are exercised unlawfully. In respect to the scope of 
judicial review of the Commission's general powers the courts 
will be slow to impose restrictive parameters on the 
Commission's powers, but may nevertheless be prepared to 
review the Commission's actions where these powers are 
exercised unreasonably or unfairly. 
2. Procedural Fairness 
The power to summon witnesses and order disclosure of 
documents to aid the Commission in its general functions is 
not accompanied by any procedural restrictions except that 24 
hours notice must be provided to any person summoned. An 
important point is that the Commission has no binding 
powers resulting from its general functions, and so in a 
narrow sense no situation is created in which a person's 
rights may be affected by the Commission's actions. This fact 
was commented upon by the Court of Appeal in the City 
Realties case, where Cooke J noted that stricter procedural 
requirements existed in relation to proceedings of the 
Commission where binding powers existed. This was 
contrasted with the right of the Commission to regulate its 
own procedure under the general functions.28 It seems 
27 Above n 23, 80. 
2a Above n 23, 77. 
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unlikely then that any procedural requirements will be read 
into the Commission's powers to obtain evidence. 
Where the Comm1ssion intends to make adverse comments 
about any body it will be required to give the person 
concerned an opportunity to put their side of the case before 
any comment or recommendation is published. This was 
recognized by the Commission and endorsed by Cooke J in the 
City Realties case.29 Such a restriction would probably lie in 
any event, as it may be considered a general principle that 
where Parliament grants a power it intends for that power "to 
be used fairly and with due consideration of rights and 
interests adversely affected."30 
3. Illegal Use of Power 
It is noted above that a wide interpretation is to be 
given to the functions of the Securities Commission. The 
question of who may be subject to investigation lies within the 
discretion of the Commission. However, while this discretion 
is broadly expressed, it is not absolute, but is bounded by the 
functions of the Commission under s 10. Any exercise of 
power by the Securities Commission must be carried out for 
the purpose of keeping under review the law and practice 
relating to securities. This restriction relates to the powers to 
conduct investigations, obtain evidence, and report either to 
the Minister or to "any appropriate body".31 Any action that 
could not be reasonably described as being in furtherance of 
these functions would be reviewable as an improper exercise 
of power as the powers of the Commission are expressly 
granted to enable it to carry out its functions.32 Alternatively 
29 Above n 23, 78. 
30 H Wade & C Forsyth Administrative Law (7th ed Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1994) 42. 
31 Securities Act 1978 s 10 (d). 
32 Securities Act 1978 s 17. 
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this could be phrased as placing a requirement on the 
Commission to consider its functions under s 10 before 
embarking on any exercise of its power.33 
In determining whether the Commission is acting in 
accordance with its functions the courts may look to the 
stated policy of the Act.34 The policy and object of the 
Securities Act is the protection of investors in the securities 
markets.35 Any examination of an exercise of statutory power 
by the Commission may look to this policy as a guide, as well 
as to the functions of the Commission. 
The requirement that the Commission work in accordance 
with its functions and the policy of the Act will be useful in 
determining whether the recipient of a comment or report 
from the Commission constitutes "any appropriate body" in 
terms of s 10 (c). It may be expected that the Commission 
would again be given a wide discretion to determine what 
bodies are appropriate, within the confines of its functions 
and the policy of the Act.36 These confines will prevent the 
Commission from being able to comment to any body where 
the receipt of such information by that body cannot 
reasonably be for the purposes of the Act. Additionally, where 
the Commission does comment to a body which could be an 
appropriate body, but does so with its dominant purpose being 
other than one identifiable as carrying out the policy of the 
Act, this will be reviewable. An example of this situation 
would be if the Commission commented to a Minister for 
33 See above n 9, 336. 
34 Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (1968] AC 997 
(HL), 1030. 
35 Re AIC Merchant Finance Ltd (in rec) (1990] 2 NZLR 385 (CA), 391. 
36 For a non-exhaustive list of "appropriate bodies" see above n 23, 79. 
For an example of bodies considered appropriate by the Commission 
see Securities Commission, Report of an Inquiry into Aspects of the 
Affairs of Regal Salmon Limited Including Trading in its Listed 
Securities (The Commission, Wellington, 1994), p 198. 
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political reasons rather than for the purpose of eliciting action 
to protect investors.37 
4. Unreasonable use of Power 
So long as the Commission holds the opinion in good 
faith that it is acting in pursuance of the Act's policy 
objectives, then the determination of what actions further the 
objects of the Act will essentially be a matter for its own 
discretion.38 The exception to this will be where an action can 
be characterised as irrational. 
Judicial review for unreasonableness is likely to be available 
against all actions of the Commission. In determining 
whether an action may be described as unreasonable, the 
focus may be placed on various aspects of that action, such as 
where evidence is called from a patently irrelevant source or if 
the Commission were to make some comment which was 
unjustified by any evidence before it. As is mentioned 
above,39 review for unreasonableness could look also to 
whether the effects of an action are disproportionate in the 
circumstances. However, while the effects of an inquiry may 
be considerable, the court in City Realties clearly felt that in 
the normal course the public interest in investor protection 
would outweigh any such concern. 
C Private Law Actions 
An important issue for any person aggrieved by an 
action of the Securities Commission will be consideration of 
the best forum or form of proceeding to take in order to gain 
some remedy. Judicial review, even where it is available, may 
37 Above n 34, 1032. 
38 Above n 23, 80. 
39 Above Part II. 
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not always be the most advantageous proceeding. 
Additionally, where a private law remedy is available there 
may be a reluctance on the part of courts to intervene by way 
of judicial review.40 
The Securities Commission and its members enjoy partial 
privilege in the exercise of their functions, which may limit 
the choices for proceedings against the Commission. Actions 
may lie in tort where the Commission can be shown to have 
acted in bad faith or without reasonable care.41 Action may 
also lie against any individual member of the Commission 
who acts in bad faith, or in certain circumstances, without 
reasonable care.42 The limited nature of this protection does 
leave open the possibility for proceedings in tort where a 
person suffers damage through some action of the 
Commission. 
1. Defamation 
Comments made by the Commission in the course of 
exercising its functions are treated as official reports of a 
person holding an inquiry under the authority of 
Parliament.43 This protects the publication of such comments 
where it is in the public interest, unless the predominant 
motive is ill will toward any person. 44 This privilege is 
generally for the benefit of third parties who may publish the 
Commission's comments.45 The statutory protection enjoyed 
by the Commission will apply to any defamation proceedings 
against it, so an actionable comment would need to be proven 
40 See Rt Hon Lord Woolf of Barnes "Droit Public - English Style" Public 
Law, Spring 1995 57, 60. 
41 Securities Act 1978 s 28 (1 ). 
42 Securities Act 1978 s 28 (2) , (3) . 
43 Securities Act 1978 s 28 (7). 
44 Defamation Act 1992, ss 17, 19. 
45 See S Todd and others The Law of Torts in New Zealand (The Law Book 
Company Ltd, Sydney, 1991) 734. 
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to be made either in breach of a duty of care or in bad faith. 
Comments or reports made by the Commission to the 
Minister under s 10 (b) may enJoy absolute privilege as 
statements by one officer of state to another.46 These 
restrictions appear to limit the scope for action in defamation 
to the most extreme cases. 
2. Negligence 
The principal avenue through which a person affected 
by the Commission's actions may be able to gain redress will 
be through proceedings for negligence, though other tortious 
remedies may be available, particularly where bad faith can 
be proven. The greatest obstacle to an action in negligence 
may be establishing a duty of care on the part of the 
Securities Commission. 
The range of participants in the markets to whom the 
Commission can be said to owe a duty of care may be 
considerably smaller than the range of people affected by its 
actions . AB a matter of policy there has been some reluctance 
on the part of courts to hold such a duty incumbent upon 
government bodies, as to do so could hamper executive 
decision-making or produce a flood of litigation.47 This 
concern was expressed in relation to the Commission 1n 
Fleming v Securities Commission,48 where the Court of 
Appeal held that the Commission did not owe a duty of care to 
members of the public as potential investors, even where the 
Commission is aware of a breach of the Act. 
Both judges in Fleming expressly differentiated between 
potential investors and issuers or companies. In City Realties 
46 
47 
48 
Lindisfarne Landscapes Ltd v Consumer Council Unreported High 
Court, Wellington , 1 O August 1983, A49/83 . 
Rowling v Takara Properties Ltd [1987] 2 NZLR 700 (PC) . 
[1995] 2 NZLR 514. 
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Cooke J had cited the liability of the Commission 1n 
negligence as a safeguard for persons affected by the exercise 
of the Commission's powers, and presented this as a partial 
justification for the court's liberal interpretation of the 
Commission's powers. 49 In Fleming Cooke P reiterated this 
comment.50 Richardson J appears to have agreed with this 
assessment, noting that the Commission "may owe such 
duties to those it investigates."51 
It is submitted that this distinction in relation to the duties 
owed by the Commission is a valid one. Whereas the 
situation in Fleming has the potential to present the 
Commission with indeterminate liability, this argument 
cannot apply where the Commission of its own volition 
undertakes to inquire into the affairs of a specific issuer. On 
the causation issue there is also rather stronger potential for 
liability where an investigation or comment jeopardizes the 
success of a securities issue or a takeover bid. 
3. Other Tortious Actions 
Where an issuer or other person 1s affected by the 
actions of the Commission there may be potential for actions 
in tort apart from those in negligence or defamation 
considered already. However these would mostly occur only 
where the exercise of power by the Commission could be 
categorized as being in bad faith . Where the Commission or a 
member of the Commission has acted in bad faith proceedings 
may be possible (depending on the circumstances of each case) 
for such torts as deliberate interference by unlawful means 
with the trade or business of another, interference with 
49 Above n 23, 77. 
50 Above n 48, 519. 
51 Above n 48, 530. 
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contractual relations,52 or even misfeasance in a public 
office.53 A further basis for liability may be the tort of breach 
of statutory duty. This tort does not require intent or bad 
faith on the part of the defendant, but may be limited by the 
same issues regarding duties of care as are found in an action 
for negligence. 54 
D Remedies 
Apart from the relative difficulties establishing duties 
of care, or wrongful exercises of power the major factor in 
deciding whether to proceed against the Commission by way 
of private or public law proceeding will be the matter of the 
remedies available in each action. The principal difference 
between the two types of action is the ready availability of 
damages in tort, which is not a traditional remedy in judicial 
review proceedings. 
If the Commission were to publish some adverse comment 
relating to any person without providing a right to be heard, 
then this action could have considerable commercial impact, 
and an action by way of judicial review might provide little 
effective relief for the person affected. This shortcoming of 
public law remedies has been recognised in relation to the 
Australian Securities Commission.55 In such a situation 
proceeding by way of tort could potentially provide the 
plaintiff with a more tangible remedy. The exception to this 
may be where the Commission denies a person's natural 
justice rights in breach of the Bill of Rights Act as mentioned 
above. Conversely, where an exercise of power by the 
52 On the torts of interference with economic relations see generally, 
above n 45, eh 13. 
53 Takara Properties v Rowling [1978] 2 NZLR 314 (CA) . 
54 Above n 45, 340. 
55 Johns v Australian Securities Commission (1993) 178 CLR 408. 
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Commission has yet to bear economic consequences, the speed 
and flexibility of judicial review proceedings might serve 
better to prevent any loss, for instance where the Commission 
has not yet published a report, but intends to, or where an 
inquiry or an aspect of an inquiry might be challenged as 
unreasonable or illegal from the outset. In these cases the 
public law remedies may in fact provide preferable outcomes. 
IV PUBLIC ISSUES OF SECURITIES 
This part of the paper considers the functions and 
powers of the Securities Commission and the Registrar of 
Companies in relation to the registration and monitoring of 
prospectuses and advertisements for the issue of securities . 
Both the Commission and the Registrar have binding powers 
of decision vested in them for these purposes. The exercise of 
these powers will have the greatest impact on issuers of 
securities. This part of the paper examines how issuers might 
be able to use administrative law remedies to challenge 
decisions of the Registrar or the Commission in relation to 
their functions under Part II of the Act. 
A Prospectus Requirements 
Section 33 of the Act states that no security may be 
offered to the public for subscription unless it is either made 
in or accompanied by a registered prospectus, or made in an 
authorised advertisement. Debt securities must have 
appointed trustees and registered trust deeds,56 and 
participatory securities must have a statutory supervisor and 
a deed of participation.57 
s 6 Securities Act 1978 s 33 (2) . 
s 7 Securities Act 1978 s 33 (3) . 
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In order to qualify for registration a prospectus must conform 
with the form and content requirements of s 39 and s 41 of 
the Act. Basically these sections require that the prospectus 
contain certain information, the details of which are set out in 
the Act and in the Securities Regulations 1983. The principal 
theme for prospectuses is relevant disclosure of information 
relating to the proposed security. 
B The Role of the Registrar 
When a proposed prospectus is submitted for 
registration the Registrar must determine certain matters. 
These matters decide whether the prospectus must be 
registered, may be registered, or must not be registered. The 
Registrar may refuse to register a prospectus if: 
(a ) It does not comply with the Act; or 
(b) It contains any misdescription or error or any matter 
that is not clearly legible or is contrary to law; or 
(c) The prescribed amount payable on registration is not 
paid.58 
The Registrar must not register a prospectus if: 
(a) The date of registration would be earlier than the date of 
the prospectus; or 
(b) He is of the opinion that the prospectus contains a 
statement that is false or misleading on a material 
particular or omits any material particular.59 
If neither of these provisions apply then the prospectus must 
be registered forthwith. 
In order to ascertain the matters needing to be considered the 
Registrar is given certain powers to require production of and 
to inspect documents relevant to the proposed securities, and 
may refer the findings of such inquiries to appropriate 
bodies.60 These powers may only be exercised at the request 
58 Securities Act 1978 s 42 (2). 
59 Securities Act 1978 s 42 (3) . 
so Securities Act 1978 s 67. 
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or with the approval of the Commission. The Registrar's 
refusal to register a prospectus may be appealed to the 
Commission, and from there to the High Court on a question 
of law. Decisions of the Registrar in relation to the powers of 
inspection may be directly appealed to the High Court. Such 
decisions will also be subject to review on similar grounds to 
those examined in relation to the Commission's powers of 
inquiry.61 
The initial question that arises in relation to judicial review of 
the powers of registration relates to the availability of appeal 
to the Securities Commission. Before considering the grounds 
upon which a refusal to register a prospectus may be 
challenged it is useful to address two questions: the first is 
whether review will be available notwithstanding the 
presence of a statutory appeal, and the second is which 
avenue might be the most advantageous one to take in any 
situation. 
1. Appeals to the Securities Commission 
The JAA expressly provides that judicial review may be 
granted notwithstanding the existence of appeal rights.62 The 
fact that an applicant chooses to seek review of the Registrar's 
decision rather than follow the statutory appeal process may 
be a factor to be taken into account by the court in 
determining whether to grant relief.63 It has been suggested 
that the most important factor to be considered is the subject 
matter of the application, and that a court should be willing to 
grant review where the application for review deals with the 
manner in which the decision complained of was reached 
rather than attempting to challenge the merits of the 
61 Coopers & Lybrand v Minister of Justice [1985] 2 NZLR 437 (HC), 
462 (CA) . 
62 Judicature Amendment Act 1972 s 4 (1) . 
63 Ansell v Wells (1982) 63 FLR 127 (FCA). 
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decision.64 
An appeal to the Commission from a refusal of the Registrar 
to register a prospectus has certain advantages over court 
action. The foremost of these is that the procedure laid down 
in the Act will almost always provide a more cost-effective 
and a faster means of resolving the issue than will a High 
Court action. The issue of speed must be emphasized in 
relation to registration. Most prospectuses are aimed for 
release at a particular date, and failure to obtain registration 
can put sufficient pressure on the time constraints to 
jeopardize the entire issue process. Thus a process which 
allows for a quick resolution of the issues must be seen as an 
attractive option. On an appeal from a determination of the 
Registrar the Commission may hear the full matter, and may 
give such directions or make such determinations as it sees 
fit.65 Balanced against this however, is the fact that the 
Commission cannot be seen as the final determinant on 
matters of law, and where an appeal revolves principally 
around questions of law it may be in the greatest interest of 
the issuer to have these questions determined at the earliest 
possible opportunity. 
So where an issuer has some objection to the merits of the 
Registrar's decision an appeal to the Commission will provide 
a relatively quick and cost-effective means of challenging the 
decision. Where however the complaint regards either the 
procedure adopted by the Registrar, or an issue relating to the 
legality of the Registrar's decision, it may be most 
advantageous to proceed directly by way of an application for 
review, which would enable the question of law to be 
determined conclusively by the courts. 
64 Above n 9, 55 . 
65 Securities Act 1978 s 69. 
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2. Grounds for Judicial Review 
There have been no cases of review of a Registrar's 
decision to refuse registration of a prospectus. However it 
appears that there is scope for review despite the appeal 
process mentioned above. The grounds for review may be 
ascertained principally from the statutory language of s 42 of 
the Act, which sets out the Registrar's powers to refuse 
registration. 
As is mentioned above, s 42 provides for three grounds upon 
which the Registrar may refuse registration, and a further 
two upon which he or she must refuse to register a 
prospectus . It may be inferred that these grounds make up a 
series of mandatory considerations for the Registrar. The 
other mandatory considerations will be the exceptions to 
refusal detailed in s 42 (4). As there is a duty on the 
Registrar to register the prospectus in all other cases,66 these 
considerations may be regarded as exclusive. Thus, refusal to 
register a prospectus for any other reason or failure to take 
into account the relevant exceptions will be reviewable on 
grounds of illegality. 
Some of the grounds upon which a prospectus may be refused 
refer to a discretion on the part of the Registrar. This 
discretion produces a more difficult issue regarding judicial 
review. The sections are worded to provide a wide discretion 
to the Registrar: in s 42 (2) the Registrar "may refuse" 
registration, and in s 42 (3) (b) the Registrar must refuse 
where "he is of the opinion" that a falsehood or misleading 
feature in the prospectus concerns a "material particular." 
Obviously in relation to s 42 (3) (b) the Registrar must hold 
66 Securities Act 1978 s 42 (1). 
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such an opinion in good faith, and such opinion must not be 
one that no reasonable person could hold. Where the evidence 
supports such a conclusion, refusal under s 42 (2) may also be 
challenged if the decision is unreasonable. However given the 
substantive nature of the questions which would arise under 
this head of review, this may be an example of an occasion 
where appeal on the merits to the Commission would provide 
greater scope for argument, and certainly a lower threshold 
for the issuer to prove. 
The discretion in s 42 (2) contains no guidelines. It is noted 
above that the Registrar must consider the ground upon 
which refusal is based. Once this has been done, it is 
submitted that the Registrar should be required to give 
thought to the policy and purposes of the Securities Act in 
determining whether to exercise the discretion, in much the 
same way as the Commission must in exercising its general 
powers. So, where a prospectus fits into one of the criteria in 
s 42 (2) the Registrar may only refuse to register the 
prospectus if such a refusal would further the objects and 
policies of the Securities Act. 
The Act sets no procedural requirements on the Registrar in 
considering a prospectus. A question of interest is whether it 
may be possible to infer a right to be informed and to be heard 
where the Registrar is intending to refuse registration. 
Justification for such a right may be found in the general 
common law rule discussed above in relation to the Securities 
Commission's general powers to comment, and referred to by 
Cooke J in the City Realties case. The power of the Registrar 
to refuse registration may be assumed to have been granted 
with the intention that the power be used with consideration 
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for rights and interests adversely affected.67 The costs of 
preparing an issue can run to over 30% of the gross proceeds 
of the public offering,68 and the critical nature of timing has 
been addressed above. In assessing the extent of natural 
justice rights that may be inferred from a statute a court will 
consider the nature and extent of the rights and interests 
affected by the decision. It seems strongly arguable then that 
the power of the Registrar to refuse registration may well 
contain a right for the issuer to be heard. Failure to provide 
such an opportunity will be susceptible to review. Further, as 
the determination of the Registrar may affect a person's 
interests "protected or recognised by law" it may be possible 
to gain review based on a breach of the Bill of Rights Act, with 
the potential for an award of damages that this could carry.69 
C The Role of the Securities Commission 
Many of the points regarding review of the Registrar's 
powers to refuse registration will also be applicable also to the 
Securities Commission's powers under Part II of the Act. 
These powers enable the Commission to suspend or cancel a 
registered prospectus on certain grounds.70 Similar powers 
exist in relation to advertisements and contributory 
mortgages under ss 44A and 44B. The Commission may 
suspend or cancel any prospectus that in the opinion of the 
Commission: 
a) is false or misleading as to a material 
particular; or 
b) omits any material particular; or 
c) does not comply with the Act or 
67 Above n 30. 
68 G Walker "Five Phases of an Initial Public Offering in New Zealand" in 
G Walker & B Fisse (ed) Securities Regulation in Australia and New 
Zealand (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1994) 327, 331. 
69 Above Part II. 
70 Securities Act 1978 s 44. 
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regulations.71 
As with appeals from the Registrar, the Commission's 
decision is final except for appeal on a question of law. The 
Act sets out a number of procedural requirements in relation 
to suspension and cancellation of a prospectus. 
The major differences in approach between attempting to gain 
review of a decision of the Registrar and one of the 
Commission are firstly the policy considerations inherent in 
an action to cancel a prospectus in force, and secondly the 
different appeal procedure from decisions of the Commission. 
1. Policy Considerations 
The power to suspend or cancel concerns prospectuses 
that have already been approved and registered under the 
Act. Thus these powers will usually be invoked in response to 
a change in circumstances relating to the issuer, or the 
uncovering of facts not known when the prospectus was first 
tendered. Given the drastic effects of cancelling a prospectus 
that is already in circulation, and which may already have 
attracted contributions, it is not surprising that these powers 
are infrequently used. The potential for harm to an issuer is 
reflected in the procedural requirements placed upon the 
Commission in the Act. However, the desire to protect 
investors remains the key consideration and aim of the Act, 
and the provisions allowing the Commission to suspend and 
cancel prospectuses that threaten to endanger investors must 
reflect this aim. Thus the Act provides the Commission with 
the ability to act swiftly where necessary to provide 
protection, and any challenge to an action will be considered 
in light of the policy objectives of the power. 
71 Securities Act 1978 s 44 (1 ). 
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2. The Appeals Process 
Appeal from determinations of the Securities 
Commission under Part II is to the High Court by way of case 
stated. Under this procedure the appellant lodges a notice of 
appeal with the Commission, and then states a case to the 
Commission setting out the facts and grounds of the 
determination and specifying the question of law on which the 
appeal is made. The Chairman of the Commission must then 
settle the case, sign it, and forward it to the High Court. 72 
The case stated procedure was historically a form of review 
for error on the face of the record, and required a writ of 
certiorari. 73 The procedure is now controlled by the Part XI of 
the High Court Rules and s 107 of the Summary Proceedings 
Act 1957. Importantly, the grounds on which a case may be 
stated are now largely the same as those on which review 
may be obtained.74 The case stated procedure is used for 
appeals from a number of tribunals and inferior courts in New 
Zealand, including some appeals from the District Court to 
the High Court. 75 In a number of instances judicial review 
has been allowed to proceed as an alternative process to 
appeal by case stated. These cases generally deal with 
complaints alleging procedural impropriety on the part of the 
inferior tribunal,76 as this is not a ground upon which appeals 
by case stated have traditionally been brought, and may not 
be considered a question of law.77 However the supervisory 
jurisdiction of the High Court in such cases extends to all 
grounds of review, notwithstanding the existence of appeal 
7 2 Securities Act 1978 s 26. 
73 Above n 30, 731 . A writ is no longer required in case stated 
proceedings; Summary Proceedings Act 1957 s 110. 
7 4 De Smith, Woolf & Jowell Judicial Review of Administrative Action 
(5th ed Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1995) 685. 
7 5 Summary Proceedings Act 1957 s 107. 
7 6 See Terry v District Court at Greymouth & Anor (1992) FRNZ 135; 
and generally, above n 9, 20. 
77 Countdown Properties (Northlands) Ltd & Ors v Dunedin City Council 
& Anor (1994] NZRMA 145 (HC) . 
30 
rights.78 It should be noted however that a court may refuse 
to exercise its discretion where it considers that the 
proceedings should have been brought under the appeal 
procedure. 79 
The practical effect of this is that the maJor grounds for 
review may be adequately addressed by following the 
statutory procedure, and an application for judicial review is 
likely to be permitted where the grounds fall outside the 
definition of a question oflaw. A concern that has been raised 
regarding the procedure is that appellants and authorities are 
sometimes unable to agree on the terms of the case to be 
stated. In such a case the appellant may seek judicial review 
of the authorities action or inaction and the court may order 
the terms upon which the case is to be stated.BO Equally 
where an inappropriate challenge is made by case stated the 
court may amend the proceedings to an application for review 
where this will provide an expeditious means for resolution of 
the issues.81 
D Challenges to Suspension and Cancellation 
The power to suspend a prospectus is intended to allow 
the Commission to move swiftly to protect investors, and thus 
contains few procedural constraints . The discretion given is 
again phrased broadly. Once the Commission is of the 
opinion that the prospectus meets one of the three initial 
requirements for suspension, then 
78 
79 
80 
81 
If [the Commission] considers that suspension of the 
registration of the registered prospectus is desirable in the 
public interest, the Commission may suspend the registration 
Martin v Ryan & Ors [1990] 2 NZLR 209 (HC). 
Above n 78. 
Boulton v Social Security Appeal Authority (1991) NZAR 343. 
Above n 80. 
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thereof for a period not exceeding 14 days.82 
The Act sets out no requirement for prior notice, which is in 
keeping with the intent of the power outlined above. Once a 
prospectus has been suspended the Commission must follow 
the procedure set out in s 44. The issuer must be notified 
"forthwith", and must be given reasons for the suspension.83 
The Commission and its employees are under a duty not to 
divulge the fact of suspension unless and until the prospectus 
is cancelled.84 The Commission must act to cancel the 
prospectus within 14 days, after which time, if no cancellation 
has been made, the suspension will lapse. On the part of the 
issuer, once a prospectus is suspended, no further allotments 
of securities may be made. 
If the Commission intends to cancel a prospectus it must give 
the issuer not less then 7 days notice of the meeting at which 
the matter will be considered.85 At that meeting the issuer 
may appear and may be represented by counsel.86 The issuer 
may also apply for the proceedings to be held in public, or for 
an order prohibiting publication of details of the 
proceedings. 87 
Suspension of registration is a power of only temporary effect. 
Notwithstanding this, it has immediate effect on an issuer, 
and it is likely that exercise of the power will be reviewable in 
limited circumstances. If an issuer wishes to challenge a 
decision to suspend a prospectus the appropriate proceeding 
would almost certainly be judicial review, as the proceedings 
may be more quickly brought before the court, and interim 
orders may be made if necessary to preserve the applicant's 
82 Securities Act 1978 s 44 (1) (a) . 
83 Securities Act s 44 (2) (a). 
84 Securities Act 1978 s 44 (2) (b) . 
85 Securities Act 1978 s 44 (1) (b). 
86 Securities Act 1978 s 19 (1 ). 
87 Securities Act 1978 s 19 (5). 
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position.88 The speed with which a case can be stated to the 
High Court depends to a large degree on the Commission 
itself. Thus the procedure is perhaps not ideal for urgent 
applications. Where the Commission has proceeded to 
cancellation its grounds may be challenged by the procedures 
outlined above. Breach of the procedural requirements in s 19 
of the Act will also provide ground for review. 
1. Procedural Fairness 
Given the statutory scheme it is unlikely that any 
natural justice requirements could be inferred from the 
suspension procedure. The situation here is analogous to that 
found under the Education Act 1964 and considered in 
Furnell v Whangarei High Schools Board,89 in that 
suspension is the first step in a statutory procedure, and the 
Securities Act does provide a thorough procedural fairness 
requirement on the C_ommission for the steps following 
suspension. Thus from the ruling in Furnell and from the 
policy objectives of the Act it may be inferred that Parliament 
has deliberately omitted any natural justice duties at this 
initial stage. 
The rigid procedure in relation to cancellation was noted by 
Cooke J in the City Realties case, and it was suggested there 
that failure by the Commission to adhere to this statutory 
scheme will be reviewable.90 Once again, however, it is 
extremely unlikely that a court would add to these 
requirements. 
8 8 Judicature Amendment Act 1972 s 8. 
89 [1973] AC 660. 
90 Above n 23, 77. 
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2. Illegality and Unreasonableness 
The factors to be taken into account by the Commission 
in suspending or cancelling a prospectus are the same, with 
the added requirement in the case of suspension that such 
drastic action must be in the public interest. Where no such 
public interest is found, the Commission must proceed to 
cancellation on notice, leaving the prospectus in force for the 
meantime. The discretion open to the Commission is similar 
both in scope and in its policy considerations to that of the 
Minister of Justice in deciding to place a company in statutory 
management under the Corporations (Investigation and 
Management) Act 1989 (CIMA). This legislation obviously 
concerns companies that are in desperate trouble, and 
situations where there is an acute need for investor 
protection. There are then some parallels to be drawn, 
particularly with the suspension power of the Commission. 
As with the power of the Commission, exercise of the 
Minister's discretion regarding suspension is dependent upon 
him or her forming an opinion as to the desirability of the 
proposed action in the public interest.91 In Hawkins v 
Minister of Justice92 the Court of Appeal held that the large 
policy content and the wide scope for judgment in such a 
decision means that it will not be for the court to enquire as to 
the existence of the facts precedent to the decision.93 With a 
decision to suspend a prospectus the facts precedent will be 
the existence of one or more of the three criteria listed ins 44 
(1) of the Act. The Commission may be expected to have the 
required expertise to judge these matters itself.94 However, 
one of the three grounds is that the prospectus does not 
comply with the Act or regulations made under the Act. In 
9 1 Corporations (Investigation and Management) Act 1989 s 3 (4) . 
9 2 (1991) 2 NZLR 530 (CA) . 
93 Above n 92, 536. 
94 Above n 92, 538. 
34 
the Hawkins case Cooke P noted that even such a discretion 
as that available under the CIMA would not allow the 
administrative authorities to conclusively determine any 
point of law.95 It may be supposed then that review will be 
possible where the alleged fault in the prospectus is a failure 
to comply with the law, and where an issuer wishes to 
challenge the Commission's finding on the basis of error of 
law. 
Although the court will not look at the correctness of the 
conclusion reached by the Commission, it will review the 
decision on the basis that the Commission failed to consider 
the public interest in reaching its decision, just as in Hawkins 
it was held that the Minister must consider whether exercise 
of the discretion was desirable in the public interest or in the 
interest of shareholders and creditors .96 Further, all three 
judges in Hawkins allowed for the exceptional case in which a 
decision could be called unreasonable in the administrative 
law sense.97 
What may be taken from this is that notwithstanding the 
urgency that could no doubt surround the exercise of the 
power to suspend, the Commission will still be expected to 
turn its mind to the issue of whether suspension is in the 
public interest. The Commission will be subject to review 
where it misconstrues the subsection or the legal question of 
whether a prospectus breaches the Act or where it suspends a 
prospectus for reasons other than those found in s 44, and its 
decision will be examinable on the grounds that it is 
unreasonable. The latter two grounds will apply equally to 
the power to cancel a prospectus, which will additionally be 
9 5 Above n 92, 534. 
96 Above n 92, 538. 
9 7 Above n 92, per Cooke P at 534, Richardson J at 538, Hardie Boys J 
at 540. 
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reviewable on the grounds that the Commission failed to 
observe the natural justice rights set out in the legislation. 
V THE SECONDARY MARKET 
The secondary market concerns trading in securities 
once they have been issued. The largest market for this is the 
share market and any form of security may be listed for 
trading in this market.98 In addition to the organised stock 
exchange the secondary market includes private trading and 
trading on overseas markets, or on other exchanges such as 
the New Zealand Futures Exchange Ltd. However, the 
largest forum for the trading of securities in NZ, and the most 
powerful participant in this market, is the New Zealand Stock 
Exchange (the "Exchange"). 
The secondary market is quite different from the primary in 
its mode of regulation. The Securities Commission retains an 
oversight role as part of its general functions, but in terms of 
specific administration and regulation of the market and its 
participants, the theme is one of self-regulation. The 
principal regulator is the Exchange, which has been described 
as "the only effective regulator in the securities area."99 The 
role of the Commission in overseeing aspects of this market, 
and the role which judicial review may play in supervising 
this function have been examined above. The actions of the 
Exchange will frequently affect a range of participants in the 
secondary market, as the purview of its listing rules includes 
applications for listing, takeover actions, trading behaviour, 
disclosure requirements and enforcement of the rules. The 
exercise of these functions may affect both listed companies 
98 New Zealand Stock Exchange Listing Rules (NZSE, Wellington, 1994) 
("Listing Rules") , s 1.1 .2. 
99 P Fitzsimons "The New Zealand Securities Commission: Rise and Fall 
of a Law Reform Body" (1994) 2 WLR Taumauri 88, note 7. 
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and their shareholders. This part of the paper will consider 
the availability of judicial review as a means of controlling the 
power of the Exchange, the application of judicial review, and 
the possible effects of the supervisory jurisdiction on the 
market and its participants. 
VI STRUCTURE OF THE STOCK EXCHANGE 
A The New Zealand Stock Exchange 
The Exchange was established by the Sharebrokers 
Amendment Act 1981 (SAA). This Act created one exchange 
to take the place of the several regional stock exchanges. The 
functions and powers of the Exchange are set out in s 4 (1) of 
the SAA. These are: 
(a ) To operate a national stock exchange ... 
(b) To promote and specify the conditions and terms of 
listing and trading of securities on its exchange: 
(c) To regulate and promote uniformity in the conduct of its 
members and of business by its members : 
(d) To promote the interests of its members and members of 
the public in relation to the listing, trading, 
underwriting, and marketing of securities. 
Section 4 (2) states that the Exchange shall have all such 
powers as are reasonably necessary or expedient to carry out 
its functions. Section 7 sets out a specific power to make rules 
"for the conduct of its members and for the conduct of 
business on its exchange." Any such rules must be approved 
by the Governor-General in Council and published in the 
Gazette .1 oo 
The Exchange maintains that investors to a large extent must 
accept responsibility for their own investment decisions, and 
has stated that its policy in this respect is very much one of 
100 Sharebrokers Amendment Act 1981 s 7 (3). 
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caveat emptor.101 The Exchange states that compliance with 
its rules is mandatory, and it will attempt to enforce them. 
However it further states that "risk of non-compliance with 
the Rules is one of many risks market participants must 
assess in valuing investments."102 This approach is markedly 
different from that followed by the Securities Commission. 
The Exchange does however subscribe to the use of disclosure 
requirements in order to minimise risk. It has established 
practices and rules regarding its members which are aimed to 
reduce the agency risk to investors.103 
The Exchange maintains relationships with both its 
members, who are sharebrokers, and with the companies who 
are listed on the exchange. There is no direct relationship 
between the Exchange and investors in the market. The 
regulatory aspect of the Exchange's · operations is largely 
delegated to subsidiary bodies created by the Exchange. 
These bodies exercise the powers of the Exchange under the 
Listing Rules and Members Rules. 
The Listing Rules are the main tool for controlling conduct of 
listed companies. Each company, upon applying for listing, 
enters into a deed of agreement with the Exchange whereby it 
agrees that it will at all times comply with the obligations of 
the Listing Rules.104 Any listed company may be censured, 
suspended or delisted by the Exchange "at any time, and in 
its absolute discretion ... without giving any reasons and 
without giving any prior notice."105 
1 o 1 New Zealand Stock Exchange Listing Rules 1989, foreword. 
102 Listing Rules Foreword para 2. 
103 NZSE "Investor Protection" (NZSE, Wellington , 1996). 
104 Listing Rules s 2.2.2. 
1 os Listing Rules s 5.4.2. 
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B The Market Surveillance Panel 
The Market Surveillance Panel (MSP) was established 
by the Exchange in 1989 as an independent body charged 
with administration and enforcement of the Listing Rules. 
The MSP was set up in response to concerns that there was 
no impartial arbiter in the relationship between the Exchange 
and listed companies. It is the hope of the Exchange that the 
establishment of the MSP will forestall any moves for greater 
government regulation of the market.106 
1. Composition of the Panel 
The provisions in the Listing Rules for the constitution 
of the MSP indicate the lengths that the Exchange has gone 
to to create an enforcement authority independent of the 
Exchange in its functioning. While the Board of the Exchange 
appoints the members of the panel, it has no right to remove 
them.107 A majority of members of the MSP must not be 
members of the Exchange.108 The current membership of the 
MSP is nine, of which only one is a member of the 
Exchange.109 
2. Functions and Powers 
The Exchange may delegate many of its powers, rights 
or discretions under the Listing Rules to the MSP.110 As the 
MSP itself sees it, its functions are to monitor the 
enforcement and administration of the Listing Rules, and the 
exercise by delegation of the rights and powers of the 
Exchange. It has a further oversight function of 
1 oe NZSE Listing Rules 1989, foreword. 
107 Listing Rules Appendix 3, paras 2, 12. 
1 oa Listing Rules Appendix 3, para 3. 
109 Market Surveillance Panel Annual Report 1996 4. 
11 o Listing Rules s 2.4.1 (a), s 2.5.1. 
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recommending changes to the Listing Rules .111 
In practice this has resulted in the MSP becoming the 
principal body enforcing the Listing Rules, with the focus of 
its activities predominantly on the compliance of listed 
companies. In line with the objective of encouraging 
voluntary compliance on the part oflisted companies the MSP 
has generally preferred to use its specific power to make 
public announcement and censure rather than its powers to 
suspend the listing of companies, though it has on occasion 
exercised this power also.112 
Other powers exercised by the MSP concern the 
interpretation and application of the Listing Rules. Under 
these rules the Exchange has the sole right of interpretation 
of the rules.113 On request or on its own motion it may also 
issue rulings stating the application of any rules, which are 
binding on listed companies.114 Finally, the Exchange has the 
power to waive application of the rules in any case.115 These 
powers are exercised by the MSP. The Exchange considers 
the power to make rulings and waivers to be vital to the 
efficient running of the market, and states that listed 
companies should be aware that any rights and entitlements 
conferred under the Listing Rules should be read "subject to 
the possibility of exercises of the powers and discretions 
reserved to the Exchange."116 
111 Above n 109, 3. 
112 Market Surveillance Panel Annual Report 1992 3. 
113 Listing Rules s 1.4. 
114 Listing Rules s 1.6. 
115 Listing Rules s 1.7. 
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VII REVIEW OF THE STOCK EXCHANGE 
It may be immediately observed that the Listing Rules 
give the Exchange and the MSP a series of wide discretions 
allowing them to alter, waive and enforce the rules, and to 
list, suspend or de-list any company. These discretions are 
apparently unfettered. It has been noted by the MSP that 
suspension or de-listing have the ultimate effect of "penalising 
shareholders by denying them a market for their shares."117 
This can be a cause for concern for shareholders who, as has 
been noted already, have no direct relationship with the 
Exchange. Whether shareholders or listed companies may 
invoke administrative law remedies where they consider the 
Exchange or MSP have acted unlawfully is not as clear as is 
the case with review of the Securities Commission. The 
predominant issue there was determining in what 
circumstances a court would permit review given the nature 
of the statutory powers granted to the Securities Commission. 
With the Exchange there is a very real doubt that such 
statutory powers exist in relation to the Listing Rules. Thus 
the initial question must consider whether there is a 
reviewable power in this context. 
It should be noted firstly that the Exchange has consistently 
argued against the application of judicial review to its Listing 
Rules. In the opinion of the Exchange: 
The Exchange does not believe that the commercial interests in 
speed, certainty, efficiency and minimisation of cost in reaching 
decisions, can co-exist with the full range of procedures 
developed in the context of administrative law controls on 
governmental and tribunal processes.118 
This comment highlights some valid concerns that must be 
weighed against the public interest in investor protection 
through judicial intervention, and the often expressed 
111 Market Surveillance Panel Annual Report 1992 3. 
11 a Listing Rules , Foreword para 12. 
41 
concerns of allowing a private body to make and enforce rules 
which "lie at the very heart of the regulation of the secondary 
market in securities."119 
A The Exchange and the JAA 
The position at present is that decisions of the 
Exchange and its subsidiaries taken under the Listing Rules 
are not amenable to judicial review under the JAA. This 
question was determined by the Court of Appeal in New 
Zealand Stock Exchange v Listed Companies Association.120 
The court held that the power to make rules set out in s 7 of 
the SAA referred only to Members' Rules, and that the 
function of the Exchange ins 4 (b) to promote and specify the 
conditions and terms of listing and trading of securities could 
not be linked to the s 7 requirement to make rules.121 The 
court considered that Parliament intended that the Exchange 
should carry out this function by entering into contracts with 
listed companies.122 
This case was 1n effect an appeal from a High Court case 
which had held that the Exchange's decisions in relation to 
the Listing Rules were reviewable.123 In the Forest Products 
case Barker J observed that the Exchange is 
a statutory body charged by the legislation with a number of 
public interest duties . It cannot be imagined that the 
legislature would have authorised it to act in a wholly capricious 
manner .. .124 
This concern is similar to that voiced by the Hon Geoffrey 
Palmer when the Sharebrokers Amendment Bill was before 
119 Hon G Palmer, (1981) 441 NZPD 3601 . 
120 [1984] 1 NZLR 699. 
121 Above n 120, 703. 
122 Above n 120, 703. 
123 New Zealand Forest Products Ltd v New Zealand Stock Exchange 
(1984) 4 NZCLC 99, 051 . 
124 Above n 123, 99, 064. 
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the House.125 This consideration was rejected by the court in 
the Listed Companies case, Woodhouse P observing that the 
content of the listing rules could not remain static in a 
changing commercial climate and still remain fair to buyers 
and sellers.126 
At the centre of the Court of Appeal's reasomng for not 
allowing review of the Exchange is the nature of the 
empowering Act. The respondents relied on remarks of Cooke 
J in Webster v Auckland Harbour Board,127 in which he 
stated that while a public body could enter into a contract, it 
could be restricted in the exercise of its rights under the 
contract by its public law responsibilities. The court in the 
Listed Companies case distinguished this decision. The main 
reason for this distinction is that the statute mentioned in 
Webster, the Harbours Act 1950, specifically empowers 
Harbour Boards to grant foreshore licences.128 However, the 
SAA, it was held, does not empower the Exchange to make 
listing rules. Rather it states that the making of listing rules 
shall be a function of the Exchange. This was the court's 
emphasis: that the making of listing rules was a statutory 
function, not a statutory power, and so could not be reviewed 
under the JAA. 
B Further Developments 
There have been no further attempts to gain review of 
the Exchange's powers under the Listing Rules . A recent 
Australian attempt to gain review of actions of the Australian 
Stock Exchange ("ASX") under its listing rules also failed, the 
court holding that such decisions were not made "under an 
125 Above n 119. 
12s Above n 120, 705. 
127 [1983] NZLR 646 (CA). 
12a Harbours Act 1950 ss 156-159. 
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enactment."129 
The decision of the Court of Appeal in the Listed Companies 
case has drawn comment for its impact on self-regulatory 
bodies in New Zealand,130 particularly in light of the 
subsequent decision of the Court of Appeal in Webster v 
Auckland Harbour Board ("Webster (No 2)"),131 and that of 
the Privy Council in Mercury Energy Ltd v Electricity 
Corporation of New Zealand.132 
The main point from Webster (No 2) is Cooke P's upholding of 
his earlier decision, and his reiteration that a statutory body 
can be in a different position from a private citizen in relation 
to the exercise of contractual rights: 
I believe that Sir William Wade is correct in the opinion quoted: 
that unfettered discretion is wholly inappropriate to a public 
body.133 
It has been commented that this decision is at odds with that 
in the Listed Companies case, and that it formed the basis for 
a "decade-long difference of judicial opinion in New Zealand" 
regarding the justiciability of commercial actions of statutory 
bodies.134 This may be a slight overstatement, at least if 
based solely on the judgments in the Listed Companies and 
Webster cases. It is worth noting that all three judges in 
Webster (No 2) based their finding on the particular 
empowerment of the Harbour Board by sections 156-159 of 
the Harbours Act.135 From this Taylor has adopted the 
reasoning from the Listed Companies case to state that while 
a statutory power will be reviewable, a statutory function will 
129 Chapmans Ltd v Australian Stock Exchange Ltd (1996) 21 ACSR 295 
(FCA), 303. 
130 See M Taggart "Corporatisation, Contracting and the Courts" Public 
Law Autumn 1994 351 . 
131 [1987] 2 NZLR 129. 
132 [1994] 2 NZLR 385. 
133 Above n 131, 131 . 
134 Above n 143, 355. 
135 Above n 131 , per Casey J at 134, Bisson J at 142, Cooke P at 131 . 
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not be.136 Within the parameters of the definition of statutory 
power in the JAA this seems a feasible approach, and the 
difference in the two cases should not be exaggerated. 
Certainly the decision in Webster (No 2) should not be relied 
upon in an attempt to have the questions in the Listed 
Companies case revisited. Its importance lies rather in the 
holding that even where a contract exists a body exercising 
public law powers may be constrained in its actions by 
administrative law principles. 
However, the decision of the Privy Council in Mercury does 
bring fresh possibility for the application of public law 
remedies to actions of the Exchange or the MSP. This 
possibility is best examined in light of recent English 
decisions relevant to judicial control of securities regulation, 
which may suggest that some degree of judicial review may be 
available under the Extraordinary Remedies provisions of the 
High Court Rules. 
VIII REVIEW UNDER THE HIGH COURT RULES 
If is noted in Part II of this paper that the provisions 
for judicial review in the JAA are intended to be 
complementary to the inherent supervisory jurisdiction of the 
High Court . In certain instances review may be possible 
under the High Court Rules where it is not available under 
the JAA. Two recent English decisions have held that in 
principle judicial review may be available of the City Panel on 
Takeovers and Mergers (the "Panel"), an unincorporated body 
which exercises regulatory power over the field of takeovers 
activity in the English securities markets. Some of the 
important findings which allowed the English Court of Appeal 
136 Above n 9, 35. 
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to come to this conclusion were expressed by the Privy 
Council in Mercury . The question then is whether this will 
permit decisions of the New Zealand Stock Exchange to be 
challenged on administrative law grounds, and if so, how the 
courts are likely to exercise a supervisory function in relation 
to such decisions. 
A Review of the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers 
The Panel exercises jurisdiction in relation to the City 
Code on Takeovers and Mergers. Like the Exchange, the 
Panel has roles as legislator, interpreter and enforcer of the 
rules relating to its area of practice.137 The Panel of course 
has a considerably narrower focus than the Exchange, as it 
does not deal with listing and delisting decisions in relation to 
the London Stock Exchange. The Listing Rules of the London 
exchange are made by that exchange under the Financial 
Services Act 1986,138 and have the status of delegated 
legislation.139 There is then a much clearer picture regarding 
review of decisions of the London exchange than is the case 
with its New Zealand counterpart. This was not the case with 
the Panel, however, which exercises no statutory authority. 
The question of whether review of the Panel's decisions could 
be available arose in R v Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, Ex 
parte Datafin PLC & Anor.140 The decision in question was 
the refusal of the Panel to uphold a complaint by one company 
that another had breached the City Code. The applicants 
sought review by way of certiorari to quash this decision, and 
by mandamus to force the Panel to reconsider the matter. 
137 See R v Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, Ex parte Guinness Pie. 
(1990] 1 QB 146, per Lord Donaldson of Lymington MR at 157-158. 
138 Financial Services Act 1986 (UK) s 142 (6). 
139 Financial Services Act 1986 (UK) ss 144-156. 
140 [1987] 1 QB 815 (CA). 
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The crucial question 1n this case concerned the power 
exercised by the Panel. Sir John Donaldson MR described the 
Panel as a body that "oversees and regulates a very important 
part of the UK financial market ... without visible means of 
legal support."141 In considering the applicability of the 
prerogative writs to exercises of the Panel's power the Master 
of the Rolls reviewed the case law on the court's jurisdiction, 
and concluded: 
Possibly the only essential elements are what can be described 
as a public element, which can take many different forms, and 
the exclusion from the jurisdiction of bodies whose sole source of 
power is a consensual submission to its jurisdiction.142 
It may be seen immediately that this represents a quite 
different approach to the question of availability of judicial 
review from that required under the JAA, where the source of 
the power is the foremost consideration. Lloyd LJ stated that 
while the source of the power in question may often be the 
decisive factor, it is not the sole test of whether a body is 
subject to judicial review. There are situations, where the 
source of the power is unclear, in which it is helpful to look at 
the nature of the power under consideration.143 
When applied to the activities of the Panel the court found 
that there was a public element to the power exercised by that 
body. The Panel plays an important role in the UK securities 
market, and operates with the aid and support of the London 
Stock Exchange and the Department of Trade and Industry. 
The Master of the Rolls noted that the creation of the Panel 
was an "act of government" that decided there should be a 
"central self-regulatory body which could be supported and 
sustained by a periphery of statutory powers and 
141 Above n 140, 824. 
142 Above n 140, 838. 
143 Above n 140, 847. 
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penalties ."144 
The argument that the Panel was a model of self-regulation 
and thus immune to review received little sympathy. Lloyd LJ 
stated that the fact that the Panel is self-regulating, and thus, 
presumably, not subject to regulation by others, made it even 
more appropriate that its decisions should be subject to 
judicial review.145 The lack of an alternative remedy was 
cited as an important reason for allowing judicial review, as 
the alternative would be a body quite above the law.146 
The ratio of the decision in Datafin has been refined to some 
degree by subsequent decisions. The phrase "public law 
consequences" in relation to an exercise of power has been 
interpreted to mean more than simply that the decision is of 
great interest or concern to the public. .Such a decision 
making power must have a governmental interest, and should 
be "a part of a regulatory system ... supported by statutory 
powers and penalties."147 This has also been expressed as a 
requirement that the body whose decision is under review 
should be identifiable as woven into a system of governmental 
control.148 It has also been emphasized that judicial review 
would not attach to a body where the affected person's 
submission to the body's authority was solely by consent 
under a contract.149 
144 Above n 140, 835. 
145 Above n 140, 845. 
146 Above n 140, 828. 
14 7 R v Chief Rabbi of the United Hebrew Congregations of Great Britain 
and the Commonwealth, Ex parte Wachmann (1993] 2 All ER 249, 
254 . 
148 R v Disciplinary Committee of the Jockey Club, Ex parte Aga Khan 
(1993] All ER 853, 867. 
149 Above n 148. 
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B Implications for New Zealand 
In 1994 the Privy Council ruled in Mercury that 
decisions of the Electricity Corporation were in principle 
amenable to judicial review .150 The reasoning given for this 
decision was that the Corporation is a public body, carrying 
on its business in the public interest, whose decisions may 
adversely affect the rights and liabilities of private 
individuals without affording them any redress.151 The basis 
for judicial review was not fully argued in Mercury, with Lord 
Templeman firstly accepting the Corporation's concession 
that review was available at common law notwithstanding the 
JAA, and then holding that review would be available both 
under the JAA and at common law on the grounds noted 
above. These grounds may be observed to be similar to the 
principles enunciated in the Datafin decision. 
The Mercury decision has been heralded as settling the 
difference in approach found in the Listed Companies and 
Webster decisions in favour of Webster.152 However the 
judgment contains no specific reference to the issue of 
statutory power as defined in the JAA. So while it is possible 
to assert that this judgment implicitly over-rules the notion of 
a function/power divide postulated by the court in the Listed 
Companies case, it is equally possible to propose that the 
question was not considered by the Privy Council, which 
approached the issue of judicial review in terms of the public 
nature of the power being examined. It should be 
remembered that in order to gain judicial review under the 
JAA in any situation an applicant will have to demonstrate 
both that there has been an exercise (or purported exercise) of 
150 Above n 132, 388. 
151 Above n 132, 388. 
152 Above n 130, 356. 
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a statutory power, and that the situation is such that the 
applicant would be entitled to relief in proceedings for one of 
the prerogative writs. It is submitted then that the decision 
in Mercury throws most light on the nature of judicial review 
under the High Court Rules, and that in the absence of any 
comment on the point it should not be interpreted as having 
over-ruled the decision of the Court of Appeal in the Listed 
Companies case. 
Even if it is assumed that this case does not over-rule the 
Listed Companies decision, it is likely to have implications for 
review of the New Zealand Stock Exchange. The Exchange is 
a statutory body charged with acting in the public interest.153 
Certainly its actions can directly affect the rights and 
liabilities of individuals who may not, especially in the case of 
shareholders, have any alternative form of redress. 
Similar arguments apply in respect of the MSP, which is 
primarily responsible for enforcement of the Listing Rules. It 
is apparent that the public nature of these powers should 
satisfy the test from Datafin . The powers of the MSP are held 
via delegation from the Exchange, and include powers to 
interpret, enforce or waive the Listing Rules. The MSP co-
operates with various statutory bodies, including the 
Securities Commission, the Serious Fraud Office and the 
Commercial Affairs Division of the Ministry of Justice.154 
The results of its investigations are at times passed on to 
these bodies, who may bring prosecutions where necessary.155 
Thus the MSP appears to fulfil the requirements from 
Mercury and Datafin of being a public body in the sense that 
it is the "centrepiece" of regulation in the secondary market. 
153 Sharebrokers Amendment Act 1981 s 4 (1) (d). 
154 Market Surveillance Panel Annual Report 1994 2. 
155 Market Surveillance Panel Annual Report 1993 1. 
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International experience suggests that "but for" the 
regulatory powers being exercised by the MSP and the 
Exchange this area would have to be subject to direct 
governmental regulation. This premise is strengthened by 
the existence of statutory bodies regulating other parts of the 
securities industry. 
The second element in Datafin was that judicial review 
should not be available where submission to the power is 
purely consensual. The Court of Appeal in the Listed 
Companies case alluded to the fact that any listed company 
may terminate the agreement at any time, and was thus 
bound only by its consent.156 However, the question arises as 
to how free this consent is. While it is possible to trade 
privately in shares, the potential for capital value increase for 
a company from participation in a continuous auction market 
can only be realised by listing with the Exchange. In this 
respect the Exchange might be described as having a near 
monopoly on the facilities required for a company to 
participate in this market. The position of the Panel 1n 
relation to market participants was described by Lloyd LJ as 
"not a club which one can join or not at will."157 The position 
of the Exchange is similar, and with listing comes submission 
to the powers of the Exchange and MSP. De Smith suggests 
that the existence of a contract ought not to be a bar to the 
availability of judicial review where "the person is left with a 
stark choice of either submitting himself to the control of the 
body or not participating in the activity concerned."158 It is 
arguable on this basis that the "consensual" nature of the 
listing arrangement should be viewed rather as a requirement 
for companies wishing to actively participate in the secondary 
156 Above n 120, 701 . 
157 Above n 140, 846. 
1sa Above n 74, 172. 
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market. 
The view that listing is an entirely consensual act ignores also 
the position of shareholders, and in particular minority 
shareholders, who are unable to influence the decisions of the 
company board in any real way. For these people at least 
there appears to be little consent, yet they are very much 
affected by the exercise of the MSP's powers, as that body has 
recognised, and as was emphasized by Barker Jin the Forest 
Products case. 
From the above points it would appear to be an arguable 
premise that the exercise of its powers by the MSP is in 
principle reviewable. When the MSP was created in 1989 the 
Exchange stated that it hoped the courts would afford this 
new body the sort of independence given to the Panel by the 
English courts.159 It could be that this signals some 
realization on the part of the Exchange that the Datafin 
decision might spell an end to the Exchange's immunity from 
judicial oversight. However, while the Exchange and its 
subsidiaries may be subject to review in principle, it remains 
to examine the degree to which the courts would be willing to 
review decisions of this body, and what remedies may be most 
appropriate. 
C Scope of Review 
There are strong similarities between the MSP and the 
Panel in terms of the type of power wielded by each body, and 
in the type of functions each has to fulfil. However these 
similarities should not be overstated. There are several areas 
in which these bodies differ, notably in the range of areas 
159 NZSE Listing Rules 1989, foreword. 
52 
under their control, and in the nature of their enforcement 
powers. Thus while guidance may be obtained from the 
English approach in Datafin and Guinness, the approach 
adopted in those cases may not always be the most 
appropriate for review of the MSP. The overriding principle 
in Datafin was that the role of the court should be "historic 
rather than contemporaneous."160 Adoption of this principle 
is in keeping with the sometimes delicate nature of the 
securities markets, and requires that in most cases relief 
would be declaratory, the court serving as a guide rather than 
an intervening body. 
The Master of the Rolls in Datafin divided the operations of 
the Panel into three sections: legislative, interpretative, and 
enforcement. This is also a convenient division for the 
purposes of the MSP, whose scope of operation encompasses 
all three areas. 
1. Legislative Functions 
The MSP reviews the Listing Rules and recommends 
changes to the Exchange, which has power under the Listing 
agreements to alter the rules.161 It was emphasized in the 
Listed Companies case that this is a necessary power to allow 
the Exchange to adjust to changing circumstances. This is 
undoubtedly true, but it is arguable whether such a complete 
freedom is required. By comparison, changes to the Listing 
Rules of the ASX must be approved by the Attorney-
General.162 The Master of the Rolls in Datafin considered 
that there would be few grounds on which to challenge 
legislative activity of the Panel unless it made rules in 
violation of its proclaimed principle of doing equity among 
160 Above n 140, 842. 
161 NZSE Listing Agreement cl 3 (a). 
162 Corporations Act 1989 (Cth) s 774. 
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shareholders.163 While this would be a fine principle for the 
MSP also, the ideal of equity among shareholders is one most 
often pursued in the context of takeovers regulation.164 
The general approach, however, is appealing. In the context 
of the Exchange it could look to the functions of the Exchange 
in the SAA, noting the requirement that the Exchange 
promote the interests of its members and members of the 
public in the listing, trading, etc. of shares.165 These 
functions are reprinted in the Members Rules as the Objects 
of the Exchange.166 The functions are sufficiently broad that 
it would seem to place little restriction upon the Exchange's 
legitimate activities to require that its rules be made in 
consideration of its statutory functions, and that they be 
reasonably in keeping with these functions. Such an 
approach would be similar to that proposed above in relation 
to the Securities Commission's functions under s 10 of the 
Securities Act. 
2. Interpretative Functions 
The roles of the MSP and the Panel are very similar in 
this area, as they both interpret their respective rules. The 
MSP can issue rulings definitively stating the application of 
any listing rule. In respect of this function it was suggested 
that the Panel be given "considerable latitude," for two 
reasons. The first is that as legislator, it could change the 
rules at any time. In the case of the MSP its rulings are to be 
treated as a part of the rules.167 The second reason given was 
1 6 3 Above n 140, 841 . 
1 64 8 Wilkinson & A Mandelbaum 'The Takeover Debate in the context of 
Securities Regulation in New Zealand: A Law and Economics 
Perspective" in G Walker & 8 Fisse (ed) Securities Regulation in 
Australia and New Zealand (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 
1994) 783, 810. 
165 Sharebrokers Amendment Act 1981 s 4 (1) (d). 
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167 Listing Rules s 1.6. 
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that the rules were intended to be applied in spirit as much as 
to the letter.168 While this same argument received little 
support from Barker J in the Forest Products case,169 it is 
consistent with the comments of Woodhouse P in the Listed 
Companies case. Such references to the spirit of the rules are 
in effect pleas for a flexible approach to interpretation. The 
need for such flexibility has been stressed by the MSP.170 It is 
conceivable that an inflexible approach to the Listing Rules 
could as often as not produce inequity for investors given the 
diverse needs of minority or majority and individual or 
institutional shareholders. Such flexibility may currently be 
achieved through the waiver procedure, which is closely allied 
to the interpretative function. 
The Master of the Rolls was of the opinion that a court might 
intervene only on the grounds of irrationality, where an 
interpretation was so far from the natural meanings of the 
words that an ordinary user of the market might be misled. 
In relation to the waiver power, which involves an individual 
company, exercise of the power might be tested also against 
the statutory functions of the Exchange to ensure that the 
waiver is not issued for an improper purpose, or is not 
unreasonable in relation to the functions of the Exchange. 
3. Enforcement Functions 
The greatest potential for disruption to the market, and 
certainly to individual companies and shareholders lies in the 
use of the MSP's enforcement powers. It is also in this respect 
that the MSP differs most sharply from the Panel. While both 
bodies can issue censures against companies, the MSP has 
delegated authority to suspend or de-list a company. The 
168 Above n 140,841. 
169 Above n 123, 99, 055. 
170 Market Surveillance Panel Annual Report 1994, 3. 
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Panel, by contrast, must rely upon the Council of the Stock 
Exchange, which may expel members or de-list companies 
who breach the Code.171 An important difference to be noted 
here is that the Council's power to de-list securities is a 
statutory power, and may only be exercised where there exist 
"special circumstances which preclude normal dealings in the 
securities."172 The SAA contains no such restrictions on the 
Exchange's power. Thus while it may be noted that it was in 
this area that the approach in Datafin was most cautious, 
stating that the court would be reluctant to intervene in the 
absence of mala fides, the Panel in this area has fewer powers 
than does the MSP, and the exercise of its delisting power by 
the London Stock Exchange would be reviewable by the court 
as an exercise of statutory power.173 
The Master of the Rolls added that the court might intervene 
where the Panel acted in breach of natural justice. In 
carrying out its enforcement role the MSP is certainly in a 
position to affect the rights and liabilities of others, and this 
is a strong argument for reading some natural justice rights 
into the suspension and de-listing procedures. If the powers 
of the MSP are accepted as public powers then this would be 
in line with the approach taken by the courts to the general 
functions of the Securities Commission. In practice the MSP 
is reluctant to suspend or delist companies, and does provide 
an opportunity for a company to state its case in the course of 
an investigation. This fact raises the possibility that 
companies may have a legitimate expectation in relation to 
their listing status that they will be heard before adverse 
action is taken. Where a particular case required urgent 
action by the MSP this could be accommodated in any 
171 Above n 140, 826. 
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litigation by exercise of the court's discretion to refuse relief. 
IX THE EFFECTS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
The conclusions reached thus far indicate that in 
general terms actions of both the Securities Commission and 
the Stock Exchange may be subject to judicial review. It has 
been stated above that the purpose of judicial review is to 
provide a check on the exercise of public power. However, it is 
equally clear that this supervision cannot be extended so far 
that the markets cannot be efficiently administered. In the 
context of the securities markets it is important that any 
judicial intervention strike the balance between insufficient 
supervision of public power and over-intervention in the 
securities market. While there is a particular need for 
protection of small investors, which may be provided by 
judicial oversight, it must be noted that around 88% of the NZ 
sharemarket capitalization comes from institutional 
investors, so the market must remain attractive to these 
participants. The Securities Commission has identified the 
New Zealand approach to the securities markets as one of 
"light-handed" regulation.174 From the cases examined above 
it is possible to draw some conclusions about the effect that 
judicial review may have on the securities markets. 
A The Securities Commission 
In relation to exercise of its general powers, the 
judgment in the City Realties case has demonstrated that the 
courts have no intention of interfering with the Commission's 
function of monitoring the securities market. The 
Commission has acknowledged that a decision on its part to 
17 4 Securities Commission Annual Report 1996 (Securities Commission, 
Wellington , 1996) 6. 
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conduct an inquiry or issue a report can be disturbing to those 
subject to an inquiry, and further it "recognises the effect that 
any determination made by the Commission will have on 
market participants, particularly those associated with the 
inquiry."175 In these situations it is issuers, promoters and 
listed companies who are most affected by the Commission's 
activities. 
It has been commented that the Commission is considered to 
be "restrained" procedurally compared to its equivalent 
regulatory bodies in other jurisdictions.176 The Commission 
itself has pointed out that it is an independent authority 
whose membership all have experience in the market rather 
than a strictly governmental body, and that this fact allows it 
to be aware of the concerns of market participants.177 This 
awareness has in turn caused the Commission to handle its 
powers with sensitivity. For instance it has become common 
for the Commission to issue confidentiality orders where this 
is requested by a party to an inquiry,178 and to state a case to 
the High Court before taking suspension action where a 
contentious issue is involved.179 The Commission's awareness 
of the ramifications of its inquiries has already been noted. 
One possibility that must be mentioned is that the current 
good practices of the Commission is due in part to its 
awareness of the court's supervisory jurisdiction, in which 
case it may be observed that judicial review is having a 
positive impact on the markets. Just as the Commission has 
observed that the mere existence of its power to conduct 
175 Above n 174, 6, 7. 
176 S Franks "Securities Market Regulation : The Emperor's New 
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inquiries is good incentive for market participants to observe 
good practices, so the mere existence of judicial supervision 
can serve to keep the Commission straight in its dealings with 
the market. 
Concern has been voiced that the Securities Act provisions 
regarding prospectuses are wide enough to permit the 
registrar to "sink time into merit pre-vetting of securities 
offerings if and when political demands, or its resources, 
require or permit."180 It is noted above that use of the powers 
in the Securities Act for political purposes should be 
reviewable. The considerable powers given to the Registrar 
and the Commission for the protection of investors and the 
efficient running of the securities markets may not be used for 
other purposes , and in this respect judicial review may 
provide an invaluable tool to prevent such occurrences. 
B The Stock Exchange 
Unlike the Securities Commission which appears to 
approve of oversight for self-regulatory bodies, the Exchange 
has stated its objections to the application of administrative 
law jurisdiction, as cited above. In assessing the likely impact 
of judicial review on this area of the market it will be 
important to return to these fears of the Exchange to see to 
what extent they may be borne out. 
The first point to be made is similar to that made above in 
relation to the Commission: indications from both New 
Zealand and English cases are that courts will be reluctant to 
interfere in this market. Even in Australia, where there is 
statutory provision for the enforcement of the Listing Rules, 
1ao Above n 176, 7. 
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the courts have sometimes been slow to involve themselves.181 
It does appear that a "light-handed" approach may be 
predicted here as well. AE, is noted above the Exchange may 
in fact accept that some degree of judicial supervision is 
likely. This may indicate that the very peripheral role 
accepted by the Court of Appeal in the Datafin case may be 
acceptable to the Exchange, and may cause little anxiety. 
The specific concerns voiced by the Exchange identified the 
issues of speed, certainty, efficiency and minimisation of cost 
as reasons against the application of administrative law 
controls. If an approach similar to that taken by the English 
Court of Appeal were to be adopted towards the Exchange 
then these fears could to some extent be allayed. The 
adoption by the courts of an essentially historic role in 
supervising the Exchange would mean that decisions of the 
Exchange could be accepted and applied with confidence in 
most circumstances, rendering the first three objections 
nugatory. Where an action of the Exchange were to lead to an 
application for judicial review it cannot be denied that the 
concern regarding minimisation of cost may be affected. This 
cannot be avoided in High Court proceedings. However, the 
volume of litigation is not likely to be very great, and in 
relation to the amount of money at stake in any decision of 
the Exchange the cost of litigation cannot be viewed as a 
decisive concern. 
There are a few situations identified above where a court may 
intervene in a specific decision of the Exchange or the MSP 
and decide to grant substantive relief. Undoubtedly such an 
action could have a marked effect on the market. The 
181 Ka/met Resources NL v Australian Stock Exchange Unreported, 
Federal Court, No. WA GB0/1992 Fed No. 505, per French J at para 
41 . 
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guideline laid down by Lord Donaldson MR in the Guinness 
case was that in that context an appropriate approach would 
be to consider the case as a whole and ask "whether 
something had gone wrong of a nature and degree which 
required the intervention of the court."182 It may be argued 
that where this is the case then the public interest, which the 
Exchange must promote, is better served by remedying the 
defect in the exercise of power than in allowing it to stand. 
Woolf LJ in the same case stated that: 
the court is concerned as to whether what has happened has 
resulted in real injustice . If it has, then the court has to 
intervene, since the panel is not entitled to confer on itself the 
power to inflict injustice on those who operate in the market 
which it oversees.183 
It must be noted that such intervention should not be 
anticipated as a common event. The court is not likely to be 
as reluctant to interfere with decisions of the Exchange as the 
Privy Council stated it would be in relation to State Owned 
Enterprises, as the Exchange is not subject to the political 
controls mentioned as restraining factors in the Mercury 
case.184 However the reluctance of the court to interfere with 
decisions of the Exchange seen in Listed Companies should 
continue in force, while the "non-nuclear deterrent"185 of 
judicial review should encourage the Exchange to closely 
observe the limits of its powers and procedures. 
182 Above n 137, 160. 
183 Above n 137, 194. 
184 Above n 132, 391 . 
185 Sir John Donaldson MR cited in Rt Hon Lord Justice Woolf Judicial 
Review in the Commercial Arena (Denning Lecture 1987, Bar 
Association for Commerce, Finance and Industry), 12. 
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X CONCLUSION 
While the sources of the regulatory powers exercised in 
the securities markets may vary, it seems possible to conclude 
that both the Securities Commission and the New Zealand 
Stock Exchange can be characterized as exercising public law 
powers, in terms of the context within which these powers are 
exercised, and the effects on the rights and liabilities of 
individuals and the public at large that their decisions may 
have. It follows that these powers may be subject to the 
supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. 
From the case law in this area it may be concluded also that 
the courts are willing to take note of the specialist nature of 
the regulatory bodies. The wide purview of the Securities 
Commission in its oversight of the markets will not be 
hampered by the application of judicial review. Likewise in 
relation to specific issues confronted by both the Commission 
and the Exchange there seems little likelihood of a court 
disregarding the expertise of these bodies. In this respect 
judicial review is likely to play a non-interventionist role. 
Due to the nature of the securities markets the form that 
judicial intervention will take may vary, and may on occasion 
consider that the good of the market demands that relief be 
merely declaratory, so that the jurisdiction of the court can 
serve as a guide for the regulatory bodies. It may be that in 
relation to both the Commission and the Exchange the 
appropriate test for direct intervention will be that of whether 
the present case has resulted in an injustice to any person. It 
is to be expected that judicial control of these bodies will be 
administered with a light hand, and it is essential that this is 
the case. Over-intervention by the courts will serve to reduce 
confidence in the markets, in turn reducing their appeal to 
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investors. Such action could cause more harm than good to 
the securities markets. 
There is currently considerable debate regarding the best 
approach to securities regulation, with a strong argument 
existing for less rather than more regulation. In considering 
where judicial review fits into such arguments it is necessary 
to view the manner in which the jurisdiction is most likely to 
be exercised, and the likely effects of judicial supervision. 
While extension of judicial review to include the securities 
markets is in a sense an extra form of regulation for the 
markets, it is regulation of the regulators . Allowing judicial 
review of the Securities Commission and the Exchange is a 
means of ensuring that these regulators exercise their powers 
within the policy constraints of the securities legislation, and 
without unlawfully affecting the rights and fortunes of 
market participants. This extra form of regulation can act to 
limit the excesses of the regulators, and exercised with 
restraint, can ensure that the efforts of the regulators are 
properly focussed and properly exercised, thus serving to 
protect the interests of all market participants. 
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